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Abstract
There are continual “crises” in health care systems
worldwide as producer and patient groups unify and
decry the “underfunding” of health care. Sometimes
this cacophony is the self interest of profit seeking
producers and often it is advocacy of unproven
therapies. Such pressure is to be expected and needs
careful management by explicit rationing criteria
which determine who gets access to what health care.
Science and rationality, however, are unfortunately,
rarely the rules of conduct in the medical market-place.
(Journal of Medical Ethics 2001;27:223–227)
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Introduction
Throughout the world there are “rolling local
crises” about “underfunding” in health care as
groups in society press the case for increased
expenditure. There are two certainties in life: death
and scarcity. A long, good-quality life free of pain,
disability and distress from birth to death is the
exception rather than the rule. Most people
confront morbidity over the life-cycle and demand
cures and care which are expensive and often of
unproven benefit. Principles and practices (mostly
only implicit) determine who is left in pain and dis-
comfort, who is treated and who is left to die. The
policy issue is therefore not whether, but how, to
ration access to health and social care. Society and
its political representatives are, however, reluctant
to confront this reality. Alan Milburn was the first
secretary of state to admit publicly the existence of
rationing in the National Health Service (NHS) at
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence
(NICE) conference in December 1999! A health
service in “political denial” stunts the development
of socially agreed rationing principles, that are
openly discussed and accountably applied, and cre-
ates a market of special pleading on both the
demand—(for example patient advocacy groups)
and supply side (for example, the pharmaceutical
industry). These are organisations with overlapping
goals which result in a single demand: spend more!
Pressure on resources is unlikely to decrease.
After all, life is a terminal sexually transmitted dis-
ease. Some social gerontologists expect that living
to 120 years may become normal this century.
Although there is some speculation that, instead of
a slow decline to death with increased disability, the
period of morbidity will become compressed, with
improved quality of life for the elderly and reduced
resource consequences,1–4 the exploitation of the
genome map by commerce and rising intolerance of
disability amongst the population, are likely to
bring with them increased pressure on health care
financing. The gap between what is demanded by
society and its capacity to provide health care may
increase, generating further political dissonance
and the search for contradictory “quick fixes” with
slight, if any, evidence bases. The privatisation of
the NHS (in the UK) or the introduction of
national insurance (in the USA) are characteristic
“panaceas”.
Who claims there is underfunding of health care?
What is the basis of their claims? What ethically
founded rules of conduct should determine ration-
ing?
Who claims there is underfunding?
The debate about underfunding in health care is
ubiquitous and debates about the NHS are replete
with assertion (rather than analysis and evidence).
Provider and consumer groups regularly review the
resources of the NHS, conclude it is underfunded
and lobby for reform. Much of this activity is not
evidence based. A group financed by Glaxo
Wellcome and chaired by a former chief executive
of the NHS, Sir Duncan Nichol, concluded that the
service was underfunded and could be “rescued”
only by extensive use of patient charges.5 Three
economists, Stoddart, Garer and Evans,6 con-
fronted by similar sectional interests in the
Canadian policy arena in 1979 and 1994, con-
cluded their review of user charges by saying that
the proposals of such advocates were “misguided
and cynical eVorts to tax the ill and/or drive up the
total cost of health care whilst shifting some of the
burden out of government budgets”. One of these
authors, Evans, has gone on to argue that advocates
of user charges are like zombies: however much you
slay them, they return, cheerfully proposing the
same misguided policy. His explanation of this
behaviour is the link between the advocates and
commercial interests.7
Poor policy advice is regularly given in the UK as
well as Canada. The Adam Smith Institute8
recently advocated user charges paid in proportion
to income and up to a limit of £120 per year, with
the poor paying no more than £60 per year. They
argued that this “co-payment model would bring
urgently needed new money into the UK health
care system”. Whilst the source funding for this
study is unclear, its launch again involved the
supply-side in the shape of pharmaceutical compa-
nies and pharmacy groups. Once again the zombie
reappears, having been resuscitated by those whose
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incomes stand to benefit directly from the addi-
tional £2.2 bn it was hoped would be brought into
the health care system.
Another supply-side group, the British Medical
Association, (BMA) has repeated a review first car-
ried out in 19709 and again predictably concluded
that the NHS is underfinanced. Its proposed solu-
tion is that expensive new technologies should be
financed by increases in private insurance.10 The
possibility that such technologies might be of mar-
ginal cost-eVectiveness, are very expensive and
probably too costly to insure was not considered. In
fact, on both sides of the Atlantic, the supply-side
advocates of increased spending (public or private)
are paradoxically at risk of not serving their
members’ interests, because of the indirect conse-
quences of their proposals.
The illogicality in the BMA’s conclusions
highlights a nice paradox for the critics of the NHS.
As Margaret Thatcher argued when introducing
the “internal market” reforms in 1989, if the NHS
were eYcient there would be no need for the private
sector. If the NHS were able to focus its resources
eYciently, it would provide only services which
were cost eVective. Yet it is these services,
epitomised by interventions such as hip replace-
ments and cataract removals, for which there are
NHS waiting lists and where NHS consultants
augment their income with private practice. Such
interventions are eminently insurable and are the
core business of private initiatives such as the Brit-
ish United Provident Association (BUPA) and the
Private Patients Plan (PPP). However, the BMA
want these activities to be more extensively
provided in the NHS, with expensive major
interventions left to private insurers. It is these
activities which are unlikely to be insurable. Pushed
to their limit, the BMA proposals would destroy the
private sector! The BMA thus seeks to advance its
members’ pecuniary interests by expanding the
NHS. As with the Nichol report, such illogicality
goes unnoticed in the pursuit of increased health
care expenditure—and higher BMA members’
incomes.
Such paradoxes are not unique to the UK. In the
United States, the 2000 presidential race was
dominated by debate about competing pro-
grammes to fund pharmaceuticals for the elderly.
Medicare in the USA provides health care for the
elderly but does not reimburse pharmaceuticals.
“Grey power” obliged Bush and Gore to confront
the issue in the face of rapidly escalating drug costs
about which the elderly were protesting. Bush’s
proposals, though modest, may lead to considerable
increases in public expenditure, which sits oddly
with Republican ideology, and would strain consid-
erably the relationship between the president and
those in the industry who contributed so gener-
ously to his campaign. Elsewhere in the US health
care system there is pressure of another kind to
address alleged underfunding. The coverage of the
Medicare programme is determined by eligibility
for certain social security benefits. Many poor are
excluded and this results in millions of children in
low income families having limited access to health
care. As a consequence there is continuous
lobbying and congressional debate about the case
for increased public funding of this vulnerable
group. But the prospect of success is remote. The
continuing lament in the USA about children’s
access to care is a reflection of the relative
powerlessness of the supporting lobbies. Extending
Medicaid or introducing “Kiddie-care” would
bring only modest gains to insurers and other com-
mercial interests such as the pharmaceutical indus-
try!
What is the basis of ‘underfunding’
advocacy?
Supply-side advocates understand some basic eco-
nomic accounting very well. Reinhardt11 has
emphasised the implications of the income =
expenditure identity in health care. Resources are
owned by households, who acquire their command
over resources from selling their labour (wages),
and owning income-earning assets (profits, interest
and rent). It is they who fund health care, and they
do it through four pipelines: taxes, social insurance
(another form of taxation), user charges and private
insurance premium payments. (See Figure 1.) This
expenditure flows through the four pipelines to
become income for the supply side.
The flow of household funds down these
pipelines determines the health care budgets, both
private and public. Budgets are distributed to phy-
sicians (salaries, fees for service and capitation pay-
ments), hospitals and other providers such as the
pharmaceutical industry. Demand-side expendi-
tures are identically equal to the incomes of provid-
ers (net of transaction costs).
Expenditure always equals income. Whenever
provider groups such as the BMA or the pharma-
ceutical industry support more expenditure, they
are also supporting increased rewards for them-
selves. They will oppose single pipeline funding for
the reason that it is harder to manipulate in their
interests (the publicly stated reason is likely to be on
grounds of freedom of choice). The impact of pro-
posed expenditure increases on the health of the
community will receive little attention—after all,
that is not, for them, the main purpose of the
system. Increased funding may not improve patient
health and may result merely in increased aZuence
for providers!
Evans’s discussion of zombies7 is a sharp demon-
stration of how diYcult it is to prevent rent-seeking
behaviour. There is a consensus among most health
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economists, although the evidence base is incom-
plete, that single pipeline funding enables eVective
cost control. Thus those countries which are
single-pipeline financed by taxation can, by control
of public expenditure limit cost inflation better than
countries where funding is fragmented (for exam-
ple, the USA). Once funding is fragmented, direct
control of one pipeline tends to be compensated by
inflation in funding via another. Thus, it is argued,
provider incomes are best controlled in tax-funded
systems. Whether the control is too strong requires
a view about what the health care system is for, ie
the pursuit of either the cost-eVectiveness of the
additional care that might be provided or the value
of the expected additional outcomes for patients
both actual and prospective.
The nice issue in debate thus comes down to the
extent to which expenditure increases generate
merely additional provider incomes or improve
patient health. Macro-economic cost control needs
to be supplemented by micro-economic incentives
which ensure eYcient resource use.
VARIATIONS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION
In all developed countries there is evidence of con-
siderable variations in medical practice. These
small area variations were highlighted by Wen-
nberg12 in the late 1970s when he and his colleagues
found considerable diVerences in the volume of
health care activities delivered to populations of two
similar areas, New Haven and Boston, in New
England. McPherson, Wennberg and colleagues
identified similar diVerences across countries.13
McPherson14 explored the eVects of demand- and
supply-side variables on variations in Britain.
There is also evidence of considerable variations
in levels of activities between practitioners and dif-
ferences in mortality between hospitals. Kind
described hospital variations in mortality in Eng-
land in 1987.15 More recently Jarman and col-
leagues have charted similar variations.16 It is
remarkable that the NHS has collected activity and
mortality data for decades but not used it in man-
agement.17
Important conclusions to draw from this litera-
ture are that variation in activity and outcomes are
ubiquitous and that policy analysts and managers
in health care systems worldwide have incomplete
awareness and understanding of them and gener-
ally fail to manage them eYciently. An implication
of these variations is that resource allocation is
ineYcient. This point of view is reinforced by lack
of evidence to support use of many routine
interventions in health care. Cochrane18 argued that
a remedy for this ignorance was randomised
controlled trials (RCTs). Whilst investment in
RCTs has risen and understanding of some clinical
practices has increased, the knowledge gap remains
considerable.19
Furthermore, ignorance about how to translate
evidence into practice is considerable. Thus whilst
the Cochrane collaboration is gradually improving
the knowledge base about “what works” in
medicine, such knowledge is not applied swiftly and
routinely.19 For instance the Harvard life-saving
study identified over 500 cost-eVective interven-
tions and found no relationship between cost-
eVectiveness and the implementation of life-saving
interventions. Furthermore it was found that there
was no relationship between cost-eVectiveness and
implementation in government regulations.20 Deci-
sion makers, by failing to apply evidence of
cost-eVectiveness, ensure people die too early!
Thus whilst the cacophony of the advocates of
increased spending on health care is ubiquitous, the
use of existing budgets is characterised by variation
and ineYciency. Practitioners and regulators adopt
interventions which are demonstrably not cost-
eVective. In doing this they enhance the perception
of underfunding and reinforce the pressure for
increased expenditures (which increase their in-
comes!) The chronic lack of transparency in
decision making and accountability for actions
should, in principle, weaken the case for increased
health care expenditure: why pour good money
after bad! However, lack of public awareness, fear of
ill health and death and the political dynamics of
the health care market-place obscure the limita-
tions of a knowledge-base and facilitate the
dominance of “experts” who declare that under-
funding is “the” policy problem.
The rationing debate
One way of subverting these processes is by bring-
ing the economic paradigm to the centre of the
resource allocation or rationing debate in health
care. Scarcity is ubiquitous and individuals, groups
and governments have to manage rationing proc-
esses. It is not a question of whether to ration but
how: what principles should determine individuals’
access to goods and services?
In health care, argument about the management
of the diVerence between finite means and infinite
ends or underfunding is particularly intense.
Rationing of access to care determines who will live
in what degree of pain and discomfort, and who will
die. Williams defined rationing as occurring “when
anyone is denied (or simply not oVered) an
intervention that everyone agrees would do them
some good and which they would like to have”.21
These two elements, “doing some good” or ben-
eficial eVect on patient health status, and “like to
have” or patient preference for treatment, are cen-
tral issues in the underfunding debate.
The medical paradigm in the age of the
Cochrane collaboration continues to focus princi-
pally on the systematic appraisal of the evidence
(with the strong preference for RCTs) of clinical
eVectiveness. Thus evidence of eYcacy, sometimes
in relation to placebo and sometimes in relation to
inappropriate therapeutic comparators, determines
whether a new drug is registered and given a prod-
uct licence by the regulating authorities. The eVect
may be small, for narrow groups of patients, and
detected over short trial periods where side eVects
are not evident. However, this is the evidence which
is used to market the product and spread its use,
appropriate and inappropriate, by practitioners.
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What is clinically eVective may not be cost-
eVective. But any product which is cost-eVective is
clinically eVective! From the economic point of
view, evidence of eVect is insuYcient to determine
the use of a therapy.22 With the health care budget
finite, the attention of decision making has to be
focused on the value of what is gained (the health
benefit) and the value of what is given up (the
opportunity cost). To get “the greatest bang for the
buck”, it is imperative to maximise the former and
minimise the latter.
Imagine there are two therapies X and Y to treat
condition A. Therapy X produces five years of good
quality life (5 QALYs—Quality Adjusted Life
Years). Therapy Y produces ten years of good qual-
ity life (10 QALYs). If patients, their carers and
doctors were asked to choose between X and Y,
they would elect for Y, which produces the greatest
health benefit for the patient. But what if therapy X
costs £100 and therapy Y costs £1,000? Therapy X
produces one year of good quality life for £20.
Therapy Y produces one year of good quality life
for £100. Therapy Y produces five more QALYs at
an additional cost of £900, ie the incremental cost
of Y is £180.
If the total available budget for this group of
patients was £500,000, investment in therapy X
would produce 25,000 QALYs and investment in
therapy Y would produce 5,000 QALYs. If the
social goal is to maximise QALY production,
therapy X is the best investment even though
therapy Y gives greater clinical benefit.
However, even if data are available about the
costs and benefits of interventions, their use is
problematic. Often such data are ignored: medical
decision makers focus on clinical eVectiveness and
royal college practice guidelines usually ignore eco-
nomic issues. The Scottish Intercollegiate Guide-
lines Network (SIGN) also ignores economic issues
in devising its guidelines.
Other bodies, for example NICE, oVer advice
which is based in part on economic data. Often this
“advice” is followed slavishly even though it might
not represent the best use of local resources. The
work of NICE and the Australian Pharmaceutical
Benefits Advisory Committee is never easy because
producer lobbies can “influence” the evidence-base
and strive vigorously for approval and a return on
their investments. Indeed there is much debate
about whether the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advi-
sory Committee, the Australian pioneer in the use
of the economic “fourth hurdle” (the requirement
to demonstrate cost-eVectiveness as a condition for
reimbursement by Medicare), has been “captured”
by the industry and “neutralised”.23
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence
was the product of a long debate24 and, as is shown
by the circumventing of the Australian Pharmaceu-
tical Benefits Advisory Committee, life can be pre-
carious in a world dominated by political expecta-
tions (so often over ambitious and unrealistic) and
expediency. However, these bodies represent sub-
stantial developments in the application of the eco-
nomic paradigm to the allocation of health care
resources.
EYciency alone is unlikely to be the sole
determinant of resource allocation. Equity issues,
whether they are based on social class and/or fair
innings arguments, may be used to weight benefit
and direct resources into activities which are
demonstrably ineYcient. Such weights need to be
explicit and adopted as a result of social consen-
sus.25
Until the principles of resource allocation or
rationing are made explicit, agreed by social
consensus and applied, health care delivery will
exhibit variation in practice and outcome and the
case for increased funding will be incomplete.
Regrettably this will not inhibit providers and
patients from behaving like Oliver and demanding
“more”. Unlike Oliver, however, who was starved
and hungry, there is less evidence that providers are
so deprived!
Overview
The rules of conduct (or ethics) in the medical
market-place are rarely explicit. The economic per-
spective is clear: to maximise benefits (health
improvements) from limited resources by targeting
resources at those activities high in the cost-QALY
league table. Whether this economic perspective
should dominate depends on society’s objectives,
but it has a strong claim for use, probably with
equity weighting, in a world of scarce resources. Its
application could counter the self interest of
providers, make exchange relationships transparent
and oblige decision makers to be accountable in
this world as well as the next! Slow movement
towards this nirvana is evident but this does not still
the chorus for increased expenditure to remedy
often unsubstantiated claims of “underfunding”.
Alan Maynard is Professor of Health Economics and
Director of the York Health Policy Group in the
Department of Health Studies at the University of York,
Heslington, York.
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